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Introduction 
As the United States military forces execute Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) activities in 
support of the Global War on Terror and Homeland Defense overseas, the development of non-
traditional partners requires a variety of non-traditional engagement activities and the discovery of 
new tools to be applied. Defense Support to Public Diplomacy (DSPD) and Military Support to 
Public Diplomacy (DSPD) move to the fore of all the functional capabilities U.S. forces can 
provide, a non-traditional role for the Department of Defense. Previously relegated to the realm of 
the Commanders, military forces, specifically U.S. Naval forces, find themselves engaging more 
and more often with the people, the governments and the militaries of nations we desire to 
develop as partners. Supported by the strengthening relationship between the Department of 
State and the Department of Defense, TSC activities conducted by the U.S. military forces 
emerge as a new tools intended to encourage and influence the nations of interest to U.S. 
national security.  
The Challenges of Creating Maritime Security Programs 
This growing phenomenon of employing defense assets in unique, non-traditional roles is 
highlighted in the efforts to plant the seeds for Maritime Security in West and Central African 
Nations. The challenge of engaging these nations in a maritime fashion is a non-trivial one. The 
region is a lower priority for the United States when compared against other world regions. 
Limited historical, U.S. Naval interest is also a factor to be considered. Compounding these initial 
challenges, most of the countries of West and Central Africa have limited (if any) maritime 
capability. The stability (or instability) of the nation will also have an impact on the willingness to 
dedicate assets to long term efforts. 
Finally, while the burden of developing and funding the resources required to monitor and enforce 
maritime security regulations may be shared among the region, the potential benefits must 
contend with historical fears, border disputes and other cultural concerns which could impact a 
government’s decisions. Encouraging the creation of a credible maritime security force and 
motivating the nations to enforce the regulations will require the United States Navy to refine and 
potentially re-define our relationships with interagency organizations and then to invest time, 
commitment and flexibility in the use of our traditional resources in as tools in non-traditional roles.  
From a national security perspective, it is interesting to note (and realistic to expect) that there is 
a mixed signal regarding the importance of this region. The West and Central African nations 
provide 12% of the daily world oil supply, and the United States currently obtains one-fifth of its oil 
from here.[1] In her keynote address at the Benin Ministerial, the U.S. Assistant Secretary for 
African Affairs stated, “Experts estimate that over the next 10 years, oil production in the Gulf of 
Guinea will grow by 40%. By 2020, the Gulf of Guinea is expected to be one of the world's top oil-
producing regions.”[2] For these economic reasons, then, the strategic importance of Africa has 
risen in the estimation of the State Department. 
The relative priority that the Department of State has placed on this region is lower when 
compared to the other regions of significant oil import, however. While priorities must be made, 
and it is understood that although we are a wealthy nation our resources are not unlimited, there 
are strong disparities in terms of U.S. relationships with various oil producing regions around the 
world. Notably, the West and Central African region appears to have less of a significant 
relationship with the U.S. than the other major oil import areas, which points to the conclusion that 
oil resources alone are not enough to elevate Africa to a major strategic interest. It is 
understandable that Canada and Mexico have unique relationships with the United States due to 
our shared borders. Saudi Arabia has a long standing partnership with the U.S. Yet even 
Venezuela has received more focused attention from the United States than has Nigeria and 
Angola, the two major oil exporters of the West and Central African region. This lack of priority 
across the region results in fewer dedicated or allotted resources to the embassies and less 
opportunities for training and education programs.  
While the Department of State assets may be few and these specific countries receive less 
visibility as a region of interest, the U.S. Navy has historically placed an equally low priority in the 
area. Sporadic visits and annual or bi-annual West African Training Cruises have been the 
highlights of U.S. Navy activities in this region in the past. The Navy’s nominal interest in the 
region was further demonstrated by the limited naval presence in the embassies. Cultural 
expertise and language proficiencies for this region are another area in which the U.S. Navy has 
not historically requested resources. At the global awareness level, capabilities for traditional 
(Russian and Chinese) and more recent (Arabic) areas of naval interest have been more 
constantly monitored, documented and subsequently resourced. Yet languages such as French 
and Portuguese, which were brought to the region with European colonialism and are still 
commonly used, have been simultaneously being categorized as “traditional” and “Cold War” 
capabilities. As a result, the U.S. Military has put much less emphasis on training linguists in 
these languages, which are critical for Africa experts. 
Cultural awareness comprises more than language proficiency, however. The maritime history 
and capabilities in the countries of West and Central Africa are additional areas which present 
unique challenges for the U.S. Navy’s efforts to improve regional Maritime Security. The history of 
maritime traditions is inconsistent across the region and even within each country. While the West 
and Central African nations may have maritime borders, they do not necessarily have a well 
established history of looking to the sea. In southeastern Ghana for example, migration from the 
interior of the continent to the coast and difficult navigation of the littorals was later countered by 
the advances brought by European trade and colonization. The slave trade created a paradox 
which improved maritime skills but simultaneously repressed littoral activities. The end of the 
slave trade created new maritime cultures that were offset by severe coastal erosion and lack of 
coastal protection. Government instability and social change further challenged the importance of 
the maritime environment.[3] Today, the impact of offshore oil production in the region has 
significant impact on other maritime activities. Unequal distributions of resources and minimal, 
environmental protection requirements have significantly decreased littoral maritime activities.  
Neither has the workforce been representative of the natural resources of the region. The 
traditional natural resources have been terrestrially-based, such as gold and diamonds,[4] which 
should be indicative of an industry related workforce. Yet on average, within the West and Central 
African region, more than 70% of the workforce today is engaged in agriculture.[5] Even with the 
advent of offshore drilling, the majority of the workforce in the region remains tied to an 
agricultural mind-set. 
This agricultural philosophy may be directly related to the relative instability of governments in the 
region. Ghana is today’s representative of stability, yet until just a few years ago, Côte d'Ivoire 
would have been hailed as the model of choice. This lack of stability in the governments may 
drive an aspect of insecurity into any labor activities aligned with or managed by the national 
governments. Without a communal, ubiquitous, national understanding of overarching, long term 
goals and objectives, the populations are left to self determinations of survival and prosperity. 
Specifically relating to maritime occupations, the risk that there will be a lack of government 
support to the maritime environment and maritime activities is a real one, given the history of 
instability of governments and the unreliable support for maritime and littoral industries. 
Potentially significant advantages gained from a long term effort may also be severely 
undermined by the instability of the national governments. While there is no doubt that the value 
of the offshore resources is clearly understood, the question is whether or not these governments 
are committed to protecting their offshore resources. This question relates to the relevance 
placed on maritime assets by the nation. There is a lack of a common, national understanding 
regarding the value of protecting natural resources, specifically those in the maritime environment. 
This lack of national accord facilitates governmental lack of action. Protection and security of the 
maritime environment will require the governments in the region to not just recognize, but to 
dedicate resources to the effort. The protection of their maritime industries, including offshore oil 
exploitation and fishing, both of which are easily exploited with no maritime security measures, 
require long term commitments. This redistribution of assets for a long term payoff however, 
directly competes with the uncertainty of the government’s longevity. 
Indeed, the governments of the region are still dealing with internal unrest as well as disputed 
border areas.[6] Hostilities and antagonisms associated with tribal cultures are common and do 
not lend themselves to easily signed collective agreements for cooperation, sharing of information 
or pooling of resources. In a 2002 assessment on emerging oil markets, one analyst suggested 
the challenge to multinational cooperation stems from the diversity of the countries on the 
western coast compared to the landlocked Central African countries. “The countries of West 
Africa have a more diverse historical and culture heritage than those of Central Africa. The 
entrepreneurial and trading spirit of West Africa has helped to overcome this diversity to some 
extent, but examples of cooperation on major industrial schemes are few.”[7] 
These are not the only challenges which underlie the initiatives and efforts of the United States 
Navy to improve the maritime security environment in West and Central Africa. Other serious 
issues in this region, such as negative military associations within the societies, army-centric 
militaries and concerns over re-colonization must also be addressed as the U.S. Navy begins its 
long term commitment to the region. Intertwined with the latter concern is the U.S. Navy’s desire 
to maintain strong partnerships with traditional allies. 
U.S. Navy Efforts—Maritime Security and Safety 
There is no doubt that the U.S. Navy represents a formidable, war-fighting, maritime capability, 
but any good mariner would tell you that no one can command the seas. All sailors, including 
those in the U.S. Navy, understand that the unpredictability of the sea is a risk common to all 
maritime occupations. For example, fishermen, merchantmen, military mariners, longshoremen, 
ferry workers, dock workers and ordinary seamen understand it is both a duty and an obligation to 
rescue persons in distress due to perils of the sea, regardless of their nationality or location. 
Through the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), which outlines the 
internationally recognized rules and laws to bring order to the governing of the world’s waters, the 
international community acknowledges the right of vessels of any nation to enter a foreign state’s 
territorial sea to engage in good faith efforts to provide emergency assistance. 
This understanding of mutual obligation to assist forms the initial foundation of a common 
maritime culture, the roots of which exist in the recognition that there are unique challenges 
associated with working on the seas and in the waterways. Safety procedures and assuring the 
security of legal, maritime activities are two basic principles to counter the challenges. Maritime 
security and safety then, are the guiding principles that the U.S. Navy is bringing to the West and 
Central African coastline. 
As already stated, the challenges are not insignificant but neither are they unmanageable. The 
initial approach for the U.S. Navy’s efforts to engage West and Central Africa could probably best 
be described as crafting the strategy for a maritime security culture. Execution of this strategy 
requires a commitment of resources from the U.S. Navy. Engagement activities must focus on 
promoting the need for maritime security and encouraging the desire to build capacity and 
capability. Reviewing maritime regulations and identifying requirements to enforce them will 
eventually lead the governments of West and Central Africa to an acknowledgement that a 
redistribution of resources must be affected. As the article in this special issue by Raymond Gilpin 
argues, area governments are beginning to comprehend what needs to be done and to come to a 
common understanding. The subsequent development of capabilities and capacity to enforce 
maritime regulations is a natural flow for the redistributed resources. The following increase in 
profits from the curtailment of illegal and illicit activities is rolled back in to the national economy, 
demonstrating the value of the program. 
To identify required resources, the U.S. Navy coordinated with embassies, interagency 
organizations and existing partner states, and reviewed traditional naval capabilities to be 
employed in non-traditional ways. A number of new opportunities were revealed, including 
teaming up with traditional, European partners, U.S. Coast Guard initiatives, training teams, 
education, demonstrations, and medical and civil affairs assistance. These new assets, combined 
with traditional capabilities and dedicated manpower, form the basic tool kit for engaging this 
emerging area of interest. 
The personnel requirement was identified relatively early in the initial efforts to engage the 
countries of West and Central Africa. The increased interaction with the U.S. embassies was 
hampered by a lack of Naval presence, which was further complicated by the Navy’s still-
developing understanding of interagency processes. This disaccord put unplanned strain on the 
limited resources of both the U.S. Navy and the country teams as each organization grappled 
with capabilities and vocabulary that had been foreign to them just a year before. 
The capacity of the embassies to support Department of the Navy efforts was therefore 
recognized early as an initial limiting factor to U.S. Naval, TSC type activities. Resolvable by a 
variety of means, the permanent solution requires time to allow manpower processes to flow 
personnel with desired skill sets, including language training, into the specific embassies. 
Similarly, the embassies will require time to ensure the personnel support structure (housing, 
health care, etc) is in place to accept the additional support provided. 
U.S. Navy engagement activities with the countries of West and Central Africa have focused on 
developing the governments’ understanding of why the surrounding waters are important and to 
encourage them to improve the maritime security and safety of those waters. Building an 
awareness of a national maritime environment, including territorial waters and the Exclusive 
Economic Zone, are illustrative of one of the initial engagement steps the U.S. Navy is taking. 
Demonstrations of new, inexpensive technologies which identify large units operating in the 
territorial waters provide previously, unimagined insights to the militaries and governments of 
Africa. This is an initial step toward helping the African countries to develop and expand their 
understanding of their own maritime borders. 
Extending the concept of partnering, intertwining long standing relationships between U.S. and 
European partners with long standing relationships between the European partner and the 
African nations provides a model for information sharing which can be repeated among all coastal 
African nations. The benefit of partnering among the coastal states can also be expressed in 
economic terms. Technological systems which provide coverage of the maritime region do not 
stop at internationally recognized borders. Information sharing agreements could decrease the 
number of systems each state needs to purchase. If the partnering concept continues to be 
extended into programs such as Search and Recovery Centers, it becomes the natural next step 
to encourage the development of compatible capabilities with neighboring states. 
Senior leader visits with government and military officials provide opportunities to explain how 
these observations identify activities which may be stealing internationally recognized, natural 
resources of the state. The means to deny the theft is the development of the capability and 
capacity to stop it. Limited, national, maritime capabilities must be strengthened through 
systematic improvements. U.S. Navy training teams and military to military exchanges can help 
assist in this. Tactics and techniques associated with maritime security are strengths that the U.S. 
Navy can bring as the nations continue to build their capacity. Eventually, opportunities for 
combined exercises and training competitions will not only improve their capability, but also 
demonstrate their competency and will, deterring illegal and illicit activities. 
While the above efforts sound ambitious, it cannot be overstated that in order to achieve the final 
objective, that of a secure maritime environment in the region, the U.S. Navy, its traditional allies 
and the governments, militaries and societies of the West and Central African region must be 
committed to a long term investment and relationship. While a strategy may be crafted and new 
tools identified within the span of a year, the realization of a mature, self-sustaining, maritime 
security culture is developed over many years, dedicating efforts and resources to the tools of the 
craft. 
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